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## No nuclear cover likely for allies, Turner says

TOKYO (Reuters) — The United States would not launch nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union to defend its own allies, former CIA chief Stansfield Turner has told a Japanese newspaper.

"It is foolish for NATO countries to assume that a European war is deterred by U.S. nuclear capabilities," said Adm. Turner in a Washington interview with the newspaper Yomiuri. The senior naval officer who headed the CIA under President Jimmy Carter was quoted as saying: "We have no idea to defend Europe with nuclear weapons based on the U.S. mainland."

"Whoever the U.S. president might be, it is impossible that the United States would wage a nuclear war on Moscow, even if Warsaw Pact troops invaded [Europe]," he was quoted as saying.

"Similarly, it is impossible nuclear missiles would be launched from the U.S. mainland to defend Japan. We do not intend to defend our allies at the sacrifice of Washington."

Yomiuri said it was told by Adm. Turner that defense treaties concluded by the United States with foreign countries did not refer to the use of nuclear weapons.

Japanese government officials have said the United States provides Japan with a nuclear defense umbrella under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Asked why the United States does not make it clear that the nuclear umbrella is an illusion, the retired admiral was quoted as replying: "Making it clear frightens Japan."

Yomiuri quoted unnamed Defense Department sources as saying: "If New York and Washington were attacked, the president would order firing missiles against the Soviet Union without hesitation."

But it was doubtful he would push the nuclear button in the case of an attack on Japan, they said.

# Israel Uses Special Relationship to Get Secrets

## *Intelligence Reaped Largely From Sympathetic Officials, Not Spies*

By Charles R. Babcock  
Washington Post Staff Writer

In the fall of 1983, the Israeli Embassy learned from a U.S. senator classified details about an American plan to fund a Jordanian military force that could respond to crises in the Persian Gulf region, according to a Reagan administration official.

The news eventually found its way into the Israeli press, was then picked up by the American press, and the proposal later died in Congress.

The anecdote was cited as one illustration of a widespread feeling in U.S. intelligence and diplomatic circles that, to learn American secrets, Israel doesn't need a ring of paid spies like Navy analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard, who pleaded guilty June 4 to participating in an espionage conspiracy. The controversial case has implicated Israeli officials here and in Israel.

An Israeli Embassy spokesman yesterday called the description of the disclosure about the Jordanian military force "baseless nonsense." And he repeated statements that the Pollard case was "an unauthorized deviation from the clear-cut Israeli policy of not conducting any espionage activity whatsoever in the United States . . . ."

But for decades, the Israelis have targeted and been able to learn virtually every secret about U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, according to a secret 1979 CIA report on the Israeli intelligence services and recent interviews with more than two dozen current or former U.S. intelligence officials.

This remarkable intelligence harvest is provided largely, not by paid agents, but by an unofficial network of sympathetic American officials who work in the Pentagon, State Department, congressional offices, the National Security Council and even the U.S. intelligence agencies, according to the officials interviewed for this article.

It is one of the most revealing manifestations of the so-called spe-

cial relationship that has developed between the United States and Israel in the nearly four decades since the Jewish state was founded.

"I was surprised at the Pollard case, but not that Americans were passing information to the Israelis. That happens with some frequency," said William Quandt, who was the Middle East expert on the National Security Council staff during the Carter administration.

One former CIA officer who met often with the liaison officer from Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, said, "No other country . . . is as aggressively close as the Israelis. They work to become intimate, and that makes a difference . . . ."

The Reagan administration, like others before it, seems ambivalent about unauthorized disclosures to the Israelis. Administration officials express frustration over the inability to keep secrets about policies that can affect U.S. relations with other countries in the Middle East. But they recognize that Israel is a stable ally in a volatile region—and one that willingly cooperates in important areas like terrorism.

Robert G. Neumann, who was the Reagan administration's first ambassador to Saudi Arabia, cited the frustration. He said sensitive cables he sent to Washington sometimes were leaked before the receiving assistant secretary could read them. "The government is honeycombed with people who do that," he said. "They aren't paid spies, but the line between that and espionage is thin."

Other American officials were less disturbed about the historical pattern of disclosures to the Israelis. They said the intelligence benefits derived from the special relationship outweigh the losses. The most frequently cited advantages were intelligence coups gained from getting access to Soviet equipment captured during Israeli wars and the exchange of information to fight terrorism.

Not everyone gives Israeli intelligence such high marks. Stanislaw Turner, director of the Central In-

telligence Agency during the Carter administration, was quoted in an Israeli magazine earlier this year as saying, "90 percent of declarations about the supposed Israeli contribution to the security of the United States is public relations." He cited Israeli intelligence's failure to spot the Arab attacks in the 1973 war and its underestimation of the difficulties in the Lebanon invasion in 1982.

"Israeli intelligence is good, but not in all areas," Turner said. "Above all, it is good at overselling its own capabilities."

For years it was CIA policy not to have Jewish Americans serve as liaison officers with the Israelis because it was felt they might be under pressure to help Israel, another former high-ranking U.S. intelligence official said.

But for years the Federal Bureau of Investigation found that the Israelis had ample access to U.S. secrets anyway, the sources said. The FBI has started dozens of files of alleged Israeli espionage in the United States, they added, many based on wiretaps on the Israeli Embassy that continued at least into the early 1970s. But until the Pollard case no one was prosecuted.

"There is no question that one administration after another handled Israeli espionage different from other countries," one retired senior U.S. intelligence official said. Political decisions were made to have U.S. counterintelligence officials look the other way, he said.

Other officials noted, however, that there were few prosecutions of Soviet spies, either, until the last 10 years. Soviet diplomats usually were quietly asked to leave the country instead.

A senior Reagan administration official said disclosures of classified material to the Israelis have been commonplace for years. "Sure it's bothersome, and sure everyone knows it. But no one does anything about it. It is high politics."

Several of those interviewed praised the longstanding cooperation between the two countries' intelligence services, based on the groundwork laid by James J. Angleton, the head of both CIA counter-intelligence and the office that served as the formal Israeli liaison for more than 20 years until he retired in 1974.

For instance, they noted that U.S. human-source intelligence on the Soviet Union for years was dependent on debriefings of Jewish emigres who traveled to Israel from behind the Iron Curtain.

For many years, too, some of the officials said, the United States sent millions of dollars in covert aid to Israel for operations in Africa that included training several African intelligence services.

The Israelis' knowledge of Africa helped their 1976 successful hostage rescue raid on the Entebbe airport in Uganda. And just two years ago, Israeli intelligence helped the CIA find an officer who had been kidnaped by the Ethiopian government.

The Israelis also have provided aid—and some of the guns it captured from the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon—to the counterrevolutionaries, also known as contras, fighting the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, sources said.

And for the past 15 years the United States and Israel have exchanged intelligence information in the fight against terrorism.

In spite of the fruits of the cooperation, there have been dissenters in all administrations—often those officials who served in the Arab world—who have protested that the U.S.-Israeli intelligence relationship was too close.

Some of those interviewed said the Israeli intelligence operations here are not considered that serious because they have targeted mostly Israel's Arab enemies in the Middle East. One official recalled that an FBI team breaking into an Arab embassy to plant a listening device years ago ran into an Israeli bugging team leaving the scene. "They waved at each other," the official said.

But the Israelis also targeted intelligence operations here on collecting U.S. science and technology that they couldn't get by overt means, the officials said.

For example, a federal grand jury in New York state now is investigating whether U.S. export laws were violated by an American company when technology to put chrome plating on tank gun barrels was shipped to Israel.

In the early 1970s the Israelis couldn't get U.S. approval to acquire aerial refueling planes and computers that could be used to simulate nuclear tests, one longtime State Department official recalled. "They got them anyway," he said. The Israelis bought old 707 jets from surplus and converted them to tankers. They ordered the computer piece by piece, he said, listing the parts by catalog number so no one would notice.

"When they go over the line [in running intelligence operations here], it's because they think it's survival," one veteran FBI counter-intelligence official said. "It's not intended to be harmful to the United States. As least they don't view it that way."

Quandt said the problem is more "with our own people than the Israelis." He said in one case where he suspected but couldn't prove that an individual was leaking classified data to the Israelis, he transferred the person to another job.

When William Clark became President Reagan's national security affairs adviser in 1982, one of his first acts was to reassign two staffers he felt were too close to the Israelis, according to two former officials.

Israeli intelligence operations on American soil started before there was an Israel, according to officials and to books based on interviews with Americans who helped smuggle guns and planes to Palestine before the Jewish state was created in 1948.

Mose Speert, 83, a retired businessman from Baltimore, said he attended a meeting in New York on July 1, 1945, in which David Ben

Gurion—who became Israel's first prime minister—asked a small group of Jewish Americans to aid the cause. Speert collected guns in a warehouse in Baltimore for shipment to Palestine, he said. The activity by the Sonneborn Institute violated American neutrality laws.

But Speert said U.S. authorities didn't bother the pro-Israel activists because "we weren't harming the United States. You could say there was almost cooperation as long as we kept up a pretense of secrecy."

W. Raymond Wannall, a former head of the FBI intelligence division, said he was in charge of investigating Israeli intelligence activities here in the late 1940s and early 1950s. He said his agents discovered a school in New York City where soon-to-be Israeli agents were trained in bugging and wire-tapping techniques. They also forwarded to the Justice Department "more than a dozen cases" of U.S. officials passing classified information to the Israelis, he said.

In those early years, the Israeli intelligence liaison was run by Angleton, rather than the Middle East division, to make sure the information didn't get to Arab countries. Angleton was most interested in "the main Soviet target" and the help the Israelis could provide from debriefings of Jewish emigres, officials said. Angleton declined to discuss his work with the Israelis.

Despite the cooperation in the 1950s, the United States and Israel also conducted operations against one another, officials said. CIA documents show the Israelis tried to bug the U.S. Embassy there in that period and the United States did the same to the Israelis here. "Each side was trying to pick the pocket of the other while trading information," one retired senior U.S. intelligence officer recalled.

Israel's President Chaim Herzog, who was an attache at the embassy in Washington, left the country hur-

riedly in 1954 after learning from a friendly State Department employee that the FBI knew about his recruitment of a Jordanian military officer, according to Wilbur Crane Eveland III, a U.S. military intelligence officer at the time.

That same year, the Israelis bombed British and U.S. facilities in Egypt in the hopes the actions would be blamed on the Egyptians and turn the West away from the largest Arab country. Instead, the Israeli agents were caught, leading to a long-running political scandal in Israel known as the "Lavon affair."

After Israel joined with Britain and France in invading Suez in 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower threatened to cut off aid to Israel to force them back from the canal. Following that, one retired CIA official said, the Israelis cut off American access to Soviet emigre debriefings for a time.

During the 1960s, the special relationship between the two intelligence services grew closer, especially after the French cut off military supplies to Israel after the 1967 war. The cooperation grew despite the controversy over the strafing and bombing of a U.S. signals intelligence intercept ship, the Liberty, during the six-day war. The attack, which the Israelis said was a mistake, killed 34 American sailors.

The most serious allegations of Israeli espionage in the United States also occurred during the 1960s. They surrounded the disappearance of 200 pounds of weapons grade uranium from a processing plant in Apollo, Pa., which spawned a series of top secret FBI and Atomic Energy Commission investigations.

No charges were ever filed, although the CIA concluded that uranium from the plant had been diverted to make an Israeli atomic bomb, sources said. Last week The Washington Post disclosed that Ra-

fael Eitan, the Israeli intelligence officer who ran the Pollard case, was scheduled to visit the uranium processing plant in 1968. At the time he was a Mossad officer, but was listed on the planned trip as a chemist for the Israeli ministry of defense.

The rise of terrorism in the Middle East in the 1970s pushed the U.S.-Israeli intelligence connection closer still, officials said.

After Angleton left in 1974, the Israeli account was put in the Middle East division. One CIA official who got his first glimpse of the Israeli "take" then said he was "appalled at the lack of quality of the political intelligence on the Arab world."

"Their tactical military intelligence was first rate. But they didn't know their enemy. I saw this political intelligence and it was lousy, laughably bad. I was horrified when I saw it because I realized it had probably been going in for years to policy makers from the Angleton shop without challenge. It was gossip stuff mostly."

The sensitivity of continuing disclosures of U.S. secrets to Israel also increased during the mid-1970s because American arms were also being sold in great quantities to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the U.S. military was deeply involved in secret contingency planning with those governments, officials said.

By the time the Reagan administration came to power, the Israelis were confident enough to ask the Pentagon for access to real-time satellite photography, complete with their own ground station and a channel dedicated to their use, according to officials. The Israeli plan was refused.

But the liaison relationship has remained close. And officials agree it will stay that way, despite occasional fallout from cases like the one involving Pollard.

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## Recovery in Pelton case linked to Soviet countermoves

By Charles W. Corddry  
Washington Bureau of The Sun

WASHINGTON — The United States suffered still-uncalculated damage in the Pelton espionage case, and how long it takes to recover will depend on how clever the Russians are at using what they learned to foil U.S. high-technology spying devices, according to former intelligence officials.

George A. Carver Jr., a former CIA official and communications expert, said "there is nothing more vulnerable to compromises than intercepts" of another country's communications. Success depends heavily on the carelessness of the country being spied on and its having vulnerabilities that it does not know about, so that it does not know its codes and ciphers have been cracked and ought to be changed.

Mr. Carver judged the U.S. losses to be "incalculable," simply because the full range of injury is not yet known, but the effects almost certainly will be long lasting.

How long the recovery takes depends on how clever the Soviets are at using the data received from convicted spy Ronald W. Pelton to devise countermeasures against sophisticated U.S. eavesdropping devices, said retired Adm. Daniel Murphy, a former deputy director of central intelligence and a former intelligence overseer in the Defense Department.

U.S. intelligence-gathering has become such a delicate, complex, high-technology undertaking that it is increasingly vulnerable to having its secrets exposed.

This seems to be a lasting lesson of the Pelton spy case and, to some degree, of various other cases of Americans selling sensitive information to the Soviet Union over the past decade.

The simple reason for the vulnerability is that thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of people at many levels of government and industry have to know something about the secret systems used to eavesdrop on the Soviets to collect military and political information.

"The field is rife with people who could be suborned," said retired Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of central intelligence in the Carter ad-

ministration. "We are in a new age of vulnerability to compromises of our technological intelligence systems."

When the systems are penetrated, it can take months or years to assess the damage and develop new devices that regain the lost capabilities. For all that was revealed about the Pelton case, the government is still unsure how much damage was done.

The House intelligence committee plans to pursue that point in closed hearings with officials of the National Security Agency, according to the committee's chief counsel, Michael J. O'Neil. The Senate intelligence committee is preparing an extensive report on the problems of counterintelligence — of catching spies.

In an interview, Mr. Turner saw the vulnerability of modern systems as the "significant point" brought home by the case of Pelton, convicted in Baltimore last week of selling secrets to the Soviets after a trial that gave unprecedented public exposure to the eavesdropping and code-breaking activities of the National Security Agency.

Pelton, employed as a communications specialist at the NSA for 14 years, declared bankruptcy and left the agency in 1979 and contacted the Soviet Embassy six months later, eventually receiving thousands of dollars for data on secret NSA projects. He was arrested last November, almost six years after his first contact with the Soviets.

"I fault the NSA for not realizing they had a highly volatile character on their hands," Mr. Turner said.

Another who stressed the vulnerability of U.S. high-tech intelligence-collection to espionage was Rudolph Hirsch, a former CIA employee and now acting director of computer and information systems at the University of Maryland.

A consultant on security and personnel practices, Mr. Hirsch said it should be standard practice for intelligence agencies to monitor their employees' solvency and, in cases of need, to aid them with loans, salary advances or loan guarantees.

In Mr. Hirsch's view, "anyone is a potential thief" if confronted by a severe enough financial emergency. He contended that an aid program such as the one he advocated could

have averted the current "spectacle" of trials involving allegations of secret-selling to the Soviet Union, China and Israel. Never in his own experience as a government consultant cleared for secret information, he added, had he been questioned about his finances, even when given polygraph tests.

U.S. intelligence-gathering today involves sophisticated submarine, surface and satellite eavesdropping devices, high-speed transmissions and supercomputers to sort out and help read coded communications.

The "bureaucratic process," with its constant rotation of government personnel, continually increases the numbers of people who know something about the complex systems, said Mr. Carver.

The Pelton case was replete with testimony that the Russians gained invaluable data on what the super-secret NSA knew about their communications links and thus how to take countermeasures to foil the U.S. eavesdroppers.

There was understandably a great deal less, if any, evidence indicating what Soviet countermeasures U.S. intelligence had detected and may already have learned how to circumvent.

Mr. Turner and Mr. Carver agreed that the damage may be longer lasting than that suffered from the Walker case, in which the Walker spy ring sold the Soviets information on hardware and software used by the Navy in coded communications.

The Navy said it had to step up production of new cryptographic equipment at a cost of "many millions of dollars" to restore its secure communications capability.

Through what they learned from Pelton — new information as well as information confirming what they already suspected — the Soviets have had to make their own moves to try to restore signals security and the NSA in turn has had to change its operations.

Mr. Turner said that "there will be a loss for a period of time" for America in the endless spy game of measures and countermeasures.

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Publicity given NSA operations in the Pelton case may have reinforced the Soviets' ideas about counter-measures they needed to take, Mr. Murphy said, but he doubted that "there was anything they didn't already suspect." As for America's damage assessment, "we know what we lost and we know what they should have learned." In such cases, the worst is usually assumed in patching up the damage.

All former intelligence officials consulted agreed that the government "wanted a conviction" in the Pelton case and thus was willing to reveal as much as it did about intelligence operations not previously discussed.

"They were sending a signal to others — this is what happens to you," said Mr. Hirsch. Mr. Murphy said the government "did a good job of walking a fine line" in revealing enough for a conviction. Mr. Turner was "surprised that they spoke openly of decoding anybody's messages," but "they wanted a conviction" and made the necessary trade-offs.

Admiral Murphy was U.S. 6th Fleet commander in the Mediterranean at the time of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and now realizes that all his plans for dealing with the Soviet fleet, if it came to that, could have been compromised by the Walker ring. "I'll never know," he said.